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We Know Who You Are and 
What You Are Made Of: The 
Illusion of Internet Anonymity 
and Its Impact on Protection 
from Genetic Discrimination  
By Christine Suzanne Davik†  
Abstract 
Recent advances in technology allow the online activities of 
Internet users to be monitored, gathered, and recorded without their 
knowledge. New electronic tools can compile extensive data on exactly 
what an individual is doing on the Web. This information can then be 
almost simultaneously cross-referenced with additional data to create 
detailed dossiers, including the user’s age, zip code, gender, and even 
health-related issues. While there is a vast amount of consumer 
information that can easily be accessed, at present there are very few 
restrictions on how the data amassed can be used. As a result, when 
consumers go online to search for medical knowledge or to find needed 
support, they risk providing marketers, data brokers, and, 
consequently, even employers with a host of sensitive information. 
Such a possibility is more than theoretical because comprehensive 
background screening reports currently exist that profile one’s social 
media activities or participation in purportedly anonymous Internet 
discussion groups. Furthermore, even when Internet users take steps 
to conceal their online activities, job applicants are increasingly 
required to provide log-in information.  
Apprehension over the potential for misuse of personal health 
information and genetic data by employers is not entirely new. In 
2008, Congress enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act (GINA), a law designed to provide protection from not only the 
utilization of genetic data and family health history in connection 
with employment-related decisions but also the initial acquisition of 
such data. However, when the Act and its regulations are examined 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S. University of 
Illinois, 1992; J.D. University of Illinois, 1995. Many thanks to the 
participants at the 2012 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property 
Colloquium held at Houston Law Center for extremely valuable 
comments and conversations. I am also grateful to Julie Welch for her 
exceptional research assistance. Additionally, I would like to thank Dean 
Peter Pitegoff and the University of Maine School of Law for financial 
support in the form of a summer research grant and sabbatical leave to 
work on this and other projects.  
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closely in light of advancements in the manner in which data is now 
gathered and the increasing ease with which seemingly anonymized 
data can be linked to a particular individual, only then do serious 
deficiencies become apparent. These defects must be corrected to 
alleviate patients’ fears over obtaining genetic testing today due to 
their concerns regarding the use of their genetic information 
tomorrow. 
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Introduction 
Recently, there has been an astonishing increase in not only the 
pervasiveness but also the invasiveness of new computer technology 
that can monitor and chronicle Internet users’ online activities 
without their knowledge.1 These electronic tools can provide 
 
1. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN 
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND 
POLICYMAKERS, PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT (2010) [hereinafter 
FTC PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf; Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold 
Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W1 (detailing an 
investigation of the nation’s fifty most widely used websites, which 
revealed that, on average, each site automatically and surreptitiously 
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instantaneous information on exactly what an individual is doing on 
the Web by surreptitiously recording extensive information regarding 
the computer user’s keystrokes and mouse movements on a particular 
site. This information can then be almost simultaneously cross-
referenced to provide additional data—often including the user’s age, 
zip code, gender, income, and even health-related issues—to create 
detailed dossiers on individual computer users.2 This is accomplished 
through computer software3 that gathers the small bits of data 
individuals leave in a wide variety of places throughout cyberspace 
and then employs sophisticated algorithms that allow for this 
information to be linked to a particular person. 
Information-gathering companies commonly argue that their 
actions are not an invasion of privacy because the individual pieces of 
data frequently obtained are not in and of themselves personally 
identifying.4 However, this line of reasoning is increasingly less 
persuasive due, in significant part, to recent technological advances. 
For example, just a few years ago, a group of researchers from the 
University of Minnesota published a study describing how easy it has 
become for data-mining companies to create exceptionally detailed 
profiles of Internet users, even when they post information 
anonymously or pseudonymously.5 Additionally, these scholars found 
that by using only three pieces of data Internet users commonly 
divulge when registering at a website (one’s zip code, birth date, and 
gender), most Americans can be identified by name and address.6  
Such data gathering has become big business and is only expected 
to continue growing. Spending on information from online sources is 
predicted to more than double from $410 million in 2009 to 
$840 million in 2012.7 While there is now a vast amount of consumer 
data that can easily be purchased, at present there are very few 
restrictions on the use of such scraping and tracking devices to collect 
the information or, of arguably greater concern, how the amassed data 
 
installed sixty-four pieces of tracking technology onto the computers of 
visitors). 
2. Angwin, supra note 1.  
3. See infra Part I.A (discussing the various computer technologies 
employed to conduct such monitoring and data gathering). 
4. See infra Part I.B.4 (evaluating the various arguments of electronic data 
gatherers in defense of their electronic tracking). 
5. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1705 
(2010) (discussing the research of Dr. Latanya Sweeney). 
6. Id. 
7. Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, “Scrapers” Dig Deep for Data on Web, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 2010, at A1. 
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can be utilized.8 This is true even when it includes sensitive categories 
of information such as health-related data. Instead, information-
gathering companies are left to develop their own seemingly 
incongruous policies. An example is Healthline Networks, Inc., one of 
the healthcare industry’s leading providers of advertising services. 
Healthline does not track users viewing “sensitive topics” relating to 
eating disorders and impotence but admits to gathering data when 
individuals instead look up information on bipolar disorder, anxiety, 
and overactive bladders.9  
Apprehension over the potential for misuse of personal medical 
information and genetic data is not, however, entirely new. By the 
time the international Human Genome Project had officially begun in 
1990, with the stated goal of fully identifying the genes and 
determining the sequence of human DNA,10 substantial concerns had 
already emerged about how such data might be utilized. This was 
particularly true in the context of employment and insurance-related 
decisions. Consequently, in the mid-1990s several bills were 
introduced in Congress in an attempt to alleviate the public’s growing 
worries.11 Research studies12 showed that patients were increasingly 
 
8. See infra Part I.B (examining the recently released FTC principles, the 
White House Report on Consumer Privacy, and several attempts in 
Congress to pass legislation in various forms to deal with such issues).  
9. Angwin, supra note 1. 
10. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY GENOME PROGRAMS, 
http://genomics.energy.gov (last visited June 22, 2012) (providing 
detailed information on the Human Genome Project). The U.S. Human 
Genome Project was coordinated and sponsored by the U.S. Department 
of Energy and the National Institutes of Health. Id.  
11. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, Genetic Nondiscrimination Federal 
Legislation Archive, GENOME, http://www.genome.gov/11510239 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
12. See, e.g., Kira A. Apse et al., Perceptions of Genetic Discrimination 
Among At-Risk Relatives of Colorectal Cancer Patients, 6 Genetics 
Med. 510 (2004) (“Findings from this study demonstrate the negative 
effect of concerns about genetic discrimination on decisions about 
utilization of genetic services. Stronger legislative protections against 
genetic discrimination and increased public education through the 
scientific community and media sources are needed.”); Rachael Brandt 
et al., Cancer Genetics Evaluation: Barriers to and Improvements for 
Referral, 12 Genetic Testing 9 (2008) (“The largest barriers to 
referral were lack of program awareness and limited knowledge 
regarding patient eligibility, improved insurance coverage, and 
antidiscrimination legislation.”); Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the 
Wait?, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 174, 175 (2008) (“There is 
considerable evidence that numerous individuals who are genetically at-
risk for some serious disorders decline potentially efficacious genetic 
testing and medical intervention because they are concerned about the 
possibility of discrimination against themselves and family members.”); 
Jeffrey N. Weitzel et al., Genetics, Genomics, and Cancer Risk 
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avoiding genetic testing and participating in related clinical trials due 
to fears of how test results might be used against themselves or family 
members.13 This was problematic from a public health standpoint on 
numerous accounts. First, the information from such tests is often 
exceptionally helpful in taking preventive measures to minimize the 
likelihood of the occurrence of the disease in the first place. 
Additionally, at the onset of a disease, such data may be essential to 
making fully informed treatment decisions and provide for the 
possibility of lessening the severity of the now present condition. 
Moreover, without patients willing to enroll in research studies, future 
medical advancements could be considerably impeded.  
Almost two decades after the first attempt to pass genetic non-
discrimination legislation, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act (GINA) was signed into law in May 2008, although it did not 
become fully effective until May 2010.14 GINA prohibits not only the 
utilization of genetic information in connection with employment-
 
Assessment: State of the Art and Future Directions in the Era of 
Personalized Medicine, 61 CA: Cancer J. for Clinicians 327, 345 
(2011) (“Additional barriers to the uptake of [genetic cancer risk 
assessment] services include . . . genetic discrimination, privacy and 
confidentiality concerns, and fear of the stigma and medical 
consequences associated with a genetic mutation being identified.”). 
13. As a two-time breast cancer survivor myself, I am all too familiar with 
the issues related to genetic testing. In 2004, my oncologist 
recommended that I be tested to determine if I had either of the two 
mutations associated with a high risk of breast and ovarian cancer: 
BRCA1 or BRCA2. As part of the informed consent process, the genetic 
counselor cautioned me that if I went ahead with testing and my results 
were positive, it could negatively impact my ability to obtain insurance 
and affect future decisions by employers. While I had some limited legal 
protection in Maine under state law, if I moved to a new jurisdiction, it 
was quite likely that I would be without such safeguards. She explained 
that this was due to the fact that only a handful of individual states 
provided substantive protection against genetic discrimination, and at 
present there was no federal law. Despite the warning, I decided to go 
ahead with the testing anyway as the information would help inform a 
number of treatment decisions that I needed to make. Luckily, my 
results were negative. However, in accord with the similar findings of 
researchers, I know of numerous women who ultimately declined to 
forgo such tests out of fear that it might not yield such a favorable 
outcome, and they would then be without protection for their genetic 
information.  
14. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-1 (2013)); 
see also OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROT. & DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON THE GENETIC INFO. NONDISCRIMINATION 
ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTIGATORS AND INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
BDS 2 (2009) [hereinafter GINA Guidance], available at http://www.
hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/gina.pdf. Title I of GINA took effect between May 22, 
2009, and May 21, 2010. Title II took effect on November 21, 2009. 
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related decisions but also the initial acquisition of such data.15 The 
original statute had numerous, serious deficiencies due in part to a 
combination of factors, including GINA’s interplay with preexisting 
laws and the inclusion of several broadly worded exceptions in the 
statute itself. Further complicating matters was the complete absence 
of some definitions altogether or the lack of clear and meaningful 
definitions, which was surprisingly the case with the term “genetic 
information.”  
Partially in an attempt to alleviate some of the inadequacies of 
the Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
proposed and then implemented regulations in 2012.16 At first glance, 
the regulations’ various additions, clarifications, and modifications 
appear to improve many of the statute’s prior shortcomings. But 
when examined closely in light of technological advancements in how 
data is now gathered, stored, and used—as well as the increasing ease 
with which seemingly anonymized data can be linked to a particular 
individual—serious deficiencies once again become apparent. These 
defects threaten the overall goal of GINA and must be corrected to 
ensure that patients are not deterred from obtaining pertinent 
healthcare information out of fear regarding how such data might be 
later utilized. 
This Article begins in Part I by discussing in more detail the 
various technologies that have made it possible to collect, categorize, 
and retain large quantities of data, as well as the various proposals to 
regulate such activities. Next, Part II examines whether the concept 
of non-personally identifiable data truly exists, ultimately concluding 
that the ability to remain anonymous on the Internet has become, for 
all intents and purposes, impossible. Part III reviews the provisions of 
GINA in its current form and the recent regulations promulgated by 
the EEOC. Part III also provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
considerable weaknesses of the Act—which are exposed when 
evaluated in light of the recent technological advancements in data 
 
15. GINA Guidance, supra note 14 at 1–2. There are two main titles of 
GINA, namely Title I, which prohibits the use of genetic information in 
connection with group health plans, and the aforementioned Title II, 
which forbids the acquisition and use of genetic information in making 
decisions with regard to employment. Id. A discussion of Title I is 
beyond the scope of this Article due in part to: (1) the fact that 
regulations related to this portion of GINA have yet to be finalized, and 
such regulations are to be promulgated by the Departments of Health 
and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (as opposed to the 
EEOC, which is responsible for Title II); and (2) questions regarding the 
way in which it will be interpreted in light of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010. 
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1635 (2013). The EEOC was charged with the promulgation 
of regulations concerning Title II of GINA due in part to GINA’s 
similarity to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
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gathering—and proposes model language to eliminate the current gaps 
in protection. Such changes are imperative to alleviate patients’ fears 
over obtaining genetic testing today due to their concerns regarding 
the use of their genetic information tomorrow. 
I. Monitoring Technology 
The Internet has had a dramatic impact on the daily life of most 
individuals. It has changed the way we interact with one another, 
conduct business transactions, and access various forms of 
entertainment. It has also revolutionized the way we acquire 
knowledge because information on virtually any topic can now be 
obtained instantly with only a few keystrokes. But what most 
Internet users are often surprised to learn is the astonishing extent to 
which our activities on the Internet provide information to a 
multitude of others. Nowadays, practically “[e]very search, query, 
click, page view, and link [is] logged, retained, analyzed, and used.”17  
A. Electronic Building Blocks of Online Monitoring  
Such pervasive monitoring is accomplished through the use of 
very small computer files known as cookies, Flash cookies, and 
beacons.18 These electronic data gathering programs are 
unsuspectingly placed on an individual’s computer when they visit an 
Internet site or download free software.19 According to an in-depth 
investigation conducted by The Wall Street Journal that reviewed one 
thousand of the most popular websites, tracking technology was found 
on the vast majority of the sites examined.20 In fact, in some instances 
more than 100 monitoring tools were installed as a result of a single 
visit to a particular site.21 The website Dictionary.com, for example, 
exposed users to what the study’s authors described as “potentially 
aggressive surveillance” by installing 168 tracking tools.22 Of special 
concern, most of these electronic devices retained the option of 
collecting health data in light of the statements contained within their 
privacy policies.23 
 
17. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: 
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral 
Advertising, 13 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 281, 282 (2012). 
18. Angwin, supra note 1. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Julia Angwin & Tom McGinty, Personal Details Exposed Via Biggest 
U.S. Websites, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at A1.  
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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Normally, tracking companies have paid the site’s owner for the 
right to install such files on the computers of those who visit the 
website.24 However, it is not uncommon for a site’s owner to be 
unaware of the extent to which large numbers of programs are being 
downloaded onto a website visitor’s computer or, in some 
circumstances, that such files are even being installed in the first 
place. But these online tracking tools are merely the basis upon which 
a virtually unregulated, “emerging industry of data-gatherers[,] who 
are in effect establishing a new business model for the Internet” has 
emerged25—“one based on intensive surveillance of people to sell data 
about, and predictions of, their interests and activities, in real time.”26 
Furthermore, such electronic monitoring files provide the foundation 
for an estimated $23 billion online advertising industry.27 
1. “Ordinary” Cookies 
Standard cookies have been around for quite some time and are 
probably the most well known of the tracking tools. They are small 
text files, which not only can be innocuous but actually potentially 
useful to an Internet user.28 Such programs essentially act as an 
“identification tag” for a particular computer, thus allowing a 
website’s storage of such simple things as an Internet user’s log-in 
name or possibly a password at the election of the individual.29 
Consequently, users will not be required to reenter this information on 
each visit to a given website.30  
However, standard cookies can also be utilized in ways that are 
arguably quite troublesome. This same technology can also be 
employed not to merely assist the website visitor but to instead 
 
24. Angwin, supra note 1. 
25. Angwin & McGinty, supra note 21. 
26. Id. 
27. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Emily Steel, “Cookies” Cause Bitter 
Backlash: Spate of Lawsuits Shows User Discomfort with Latest 
Innovations in Online-Tracking Technology, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 
2010, at B1. 
28. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 289 (“Starting in the 1990s, 
cookies were initially used to carry information between different web 
pages and offer re-identification of repeat visitors for usability 
reasons.”); Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Quashed Effort to Boost Online 
Privacy, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 2010, at A1 (“Some cookies, such as 
those installed when a user asks a favorite website to remember his 
password, don’t do tracking.”). 
29. See Wingfield, supra note 28; see also Interview by Terry Gross, Fresh 
Air, Nat’l Pub. Radio, with Julia Angwin, Senior Tech. Editor, Wall St. 
J. [hereinafter Fresh Air]. 
30. Valentino-DeVries & Steel, supra note 27. 
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benefit third parties generally unknown to the computer user.31 This is 
because these text files can alternatively be programmed in such a 
way that they continuously track Internet users across the entire 
Web, thereby constructing a vast database of information on an 
individual’s browsing habits and personal interests.32 The information 
is then assembled into exceptionally detailed profiles and can often 
include personal health data.33 
2. “Special” Cookies 
Another category of electronic monitoring tools are those known 
as “Flash cookies” or “Flash local shared objects.”34 These files are so 
named because they are installed on an Internet user’s computer when 
an individual visits a website that utilizes Adobe’s Flash video player 
technology.35 Flash cookies were originally designed to simply store 
information about a particular user’s preferences, such as one’s typical 
volume setting when watching YouTube videos online.36 However, 
they can also be used to gather information on a computer user’s 
online browsing activities. In this way, they are functionally similar to 
ordinary cookies, although Flash cookies have certain attributes that 
make them potentially even more insidious.37  
Unlike regular cookies, Flash cookies are stored in an area of a 
computer that cannot be controlled by a user’s Internet browser.38 
Therefore, if an individual takes steps to remove traditional cookies, 
that process is unlikely to have any impact on these “special” 
cookies.39 Consequently, the Flash cookies will still remain and 
 
31. Wingfield, supra note 28; Fresh Air, supra note 29. 
32. Wingfield, supra note 28. 
33. The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked 
World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting 
Innovation in the Global Digital Economy 11 (2012) [hereinafter 
White House Report]. 
34. FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 66; see also Tanzina 
Vega, Web Code Offers New Ways to See What Users Do Online, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 11, 2010, at A1 (discussing new and future monitoring tools 
that may be useful in accessing users’ online activities but not directly 
referencing “Flash cookies” or “Flash local shared objects”).  
35. FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 66; Fresh Air, supra note 
29. 
36. Angwin, supra note 1. 
37. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 293. 
38. FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 66 n.154; see also Vega, 
supra note 34 (detailing a new type of cookie called an “Evercookie,” 
which stores information in at least ten places on the computer). 
39. FTC PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 66 n.154. Although not 
used by the FTC in its report, the phrase “special cookies” has been 
recognized elsewhere. E.g., Arun Kumar, Browser Independent 
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continue to collect user information. But even more problematic is the 
fact that the Flash cookies can be used by data collectors to reinstall 
any of the regular cookies an individual had previously deleted.40 Such 
“respawning”41 can only be prevented if a consumer is knowledgeable 
regarding the existence of Flash cookies, goes online to Adobe’s 
website, and then successfully follows the instructions supplied to 
eliminate them.42 
3. Beacons 
A third type of commonly used tracking technology is most often 
referred to as a “beacon[ ],” although this type is also known as a 
“Web bug[ ]” or a “pixel[ ].”43 This tiny piece of computer software 
runs invisibly on a web page when an Internet user visits a particular 
site.44 Beacons can then monitor and record exactly what you are 
doing while online, such as where your mouse moved or even 
individual keystrokes.45  
This category of monitoring tool is unique because instead of 
being installed on an Internet user’s computer, it “run[s] live” while a 
person is exploring the various pages of a website that contains at 
 
Cookies—Lets the Cat Out of the Bag?, The Windows Club (Sept. 4, 
2013), http://www.thewindowsclub.com/browser-independent-cookies 
(“What does a Flash cookie do? Let’s take a look at these special cookies, 
what they do, if they are bad and how to remove them, if need be.”); 
Flash Cookies and What You Don’t Know, NDARKNESS (Oct. 10, 2009), 
http://www.ndarkness.com/2009/10/62/flash-cookies-and-what-you-dont-
know/ (“The technology I am referring to is the flash plugin, currently 
developed by Adobe. These ‘special’ cookies are not created or treated the 
same way as the cookies that we have all come to know and love. In fact 
your browser has, on its own, no control over these cookies at all.”). 
40. Angwin, supra note 1. 
41. Although not used by Ms. Angwin in her article, the term “respawn” is 
widely used to refer to a Flash cookie’s ability to reinstall regular 
cookies. E.g., Bose v. Interclick, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9183(DAB), 2011 WL 
4343517, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (“When a computer user 
deletes a browser cookie, the flash cookie ‘respawns’ the browser cookie 
without notice to or consent of the user.”); Aleecia M. 
McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, A Survey of the Use of 
Adobe Flash Local Shared Objects to Respawn HTTP Cookie 
3 (2011), available at http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers/ 
CMUCyLab11001.pdf. 
42. Angwin, supra note 1; FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 66 
n.154. 
43. Angwin, supra note 1. 
44. Id.; see also Fresh Air, supra note 29 (explaining that the beacon runs 
in the background while a person navigates a web page). 
45. Angwin, supra note 1. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
We Know Who You Are and What You Are Made Of 
27 
least one beacon.46 Moreover, this is usually the case because a 
website typically contains multiple beacons from various third parties. 
In fact, in the earlier discussed study conducted by The Wall Street 
Journal, the majority of websites examined had at least seven beacons 
from outside companies, including one popular website that had more 
than forty.47 Furthermore, many of the identified businesses that 
perform this electronic monitoring have acknowledged that, among 
other things, they actually track health conditions.48 
B. Regulation of Tracking Activities 
The legality of online tracking as a whole is quite unsettled. This 
is due in part to the fact that the legal system has not been able to 
adequately keep pace with the rapid changes in technology. 
Consequently, the legal status of placing monitoring programs on 
Internet users’ computers without their consent, as well as the 
subsequent collection and later use of data that these electronic tools 
facilitate, is not clear. While these activities arguably implicate 
statutes such as the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 
which prohibits accessing a computer without authorization,49 or 
possibly federal wiretapping legislation,50 there are no statutes or 
regulations directly on point.51 
1. Lawsuits 
The few decisions that have been handed down regarding 
electronic tracking tools have only considered the legality of ordinary 
cookies.52 In 2001 and 2003, two separate federal courts held that 
advertising companies did not violate federal laws by placing standard 
cookies on the computers of Internet users who visited websites with 
 
46. Fresh Air, supra note 29; see also Angwin, supra note 1 (explaining 
generally how a beacon tracks a visitor on a website). 
47. Angwin, supra note 1 (noting that, according to the study, 
Dictionary.com had forty-one beacons, the most for any site examined). 
48. Id. 
49. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). For a detailed 
analysis of the CFAA’s introductory statement, see Christine S. Davik 
(f/k/a Christine Davik Galbraith), ACCESS DENIED: Improper Use of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly 
Accessible Internet Websites, 63 Md. L. Rev. 320 (2004). 
50. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006). 
51. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 313 (stating that, while it is 
“tangentially subject to various laws, . . . online behavioral tracking 
remains largely unregulated”). 
52. Angwin, supra note 1; Valentino-DeVries & Steel, supra note 27. 
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which the companies were affiliated.53 Even so, the precedential 
impact of these rulings is probably quite limited. This is because the 
nature of the data gathered and the purposes for which it was then 
used are arguably rather primitive when compared to the practices of 
today.54  
Recently, however, numerous lawsuits have been filed challenging 
these more powerful, technologically advanced data-gathering 
programs.55 The complaints assert that the use of these monitoring 
devices violates the CFAA and statutes prohibiting deceptive trade 
practices.56 Nonetheless, it will likely be some time before any 
 
53. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003), 
dismissed on remand, 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding 
that while the defendant accidentally collected personally identifiable 
information, the defendant lacked the requisite intent set forth in the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act); In re DoubleClick, Inc. 
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that 
tracking did not violate federal law where the trackers only collected 
information concerning activities on related sites, trackers could not 
access users’ files or programs, and users could easily opt out). 
54. See Angwin, supra note 1 (discussing both the original “basic cookies” 
and the more advanced “Flash cookies” and “beacons”). 
55. E.g., Bose v. Interclick, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9183(DAB), 2011 WL 4343517 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011); see also Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 
292–94 (stating that numerous class actions have been filed that allege 
misuse of Flash cookies); Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Lawsuit Tackles 
Files That “Re-Spawn” Tracking Cookies, Wall St. J. (July 30, 2010, 
7:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/07/30/lawsuit-tackles-files-
that-re-spawn-tracking-cookies/ (discussing a lawsuit against Quantcast, 
ABC, NBC, and others regarding Flash cookies); Valentino-DeVries & 
Steel, supra note 27 (discussing six suits filed in the Central District of 
California against websites and companies using the more sophisticated 
tracking software); Tanzina Vega, Code That Tracks Users’ Browsing 
Prompts Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2010, at B3 (stating that at 
least five class action suits have been filed against various companies for 
using Flash cookies). 
56. Complaint at 10–14, Rona v. Clearspring Techs., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-
07786-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010); Complaint at 9–14, Godoy v. 
Quantcast Corp., No. 2:10-cv-07662-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010); 
Complaint at 59–77, Davis v. VideoEgg, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-07112-GW-
JCG (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010); Complaint at 12–27 Intzekostas v. Fox 
Entm’t Grp., No. 2:10-cv-06586-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010); 
Complaint at 43–57, La Court v. Specific Media, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-
01256-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2010); Complaint at 44–59, White 
v. Clearspring Techs., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-05948-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
17, 2010); Complaint at 12–19, Aguirre v. Quantcast Corp., No. 2:10-cv-
05716-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010); Complaint at 99–116, Valdez 
v. Quantcast Corp., No. 2:10-cv-05484-GW-JCG (C.D. Cal. July 23, 
2010); see also Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 292 (referring to 
several of the named cases as bringing claims for the defendants’ use of 
Flash cookies). 
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significant body of case law emerges regarding the treatment of this 
new technology.  
2. Congressional Measures 
The issue of protecting consumers from the pervasive use of 
monitoring technology is increasingly garnering the attention of 
Congress. Various legislative proposals57 have been introduced of late 
to deal with the public’s increasing “discomfort with the tracking of 
their online searches and browsing activities, which they believe to be 
private.”58 Congressional bills have generally taken two distinct forms. 
One category of legislation requires that a consumer be provided with 
the ability to prohibit entities from gathering and using data about an 
individual’s actions on the Internet, the so-called “Do Not Track” 
option.59 The other type is a general privacy statute that would 
obligate companies to clearly disclose the personal information they 
collect, reveal how such data is then utilized, and provide consumers 
with an opt-out mechanism for certain uses.60  
Currently, however, all of the various bills are stalled in Congress 
and, not surprisingly, face some significant resistance. Google Inc., 
Facebook, Apple Inc., and a multitude of other technology-based 
companies have been vigorously lobbying against congressional 
proposals that would afford Internet users more control over the 
ability of companies to monitor their online activities.61 Reports  
57. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (read twice and referred to the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & 
Transp.); Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 1528, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (referred to the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce); Best 
Practices Act, H.R. 611, 112th Cong. (2011) (referred to the H. Comm. 
on Energy & Commerce); Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 
112th Congress (2011) (referred to the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce); Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (referred to the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce); Do-Not-
Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011) (read twice and 
referred to the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.). 
58. FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
59. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1814, 1889–90 (2011); see also Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 
327–32 (detailing the various bills introduced to address consumer 
privacy concerns). 
60. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 59, at 1889–90; Jacqui Cheng, 
Consumer Groups Skeptical About New Kerry-McCain Privacy Bill, 
Ars Technica (Apr. 12, 2011, 4:27 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech 
policy/2011/04/consumer-groups-skeptical-about-new-kerry-mccain-
privacy-bill/. 
61. Jasmin Melvin, Web Giants’ Consumer Privacy Strategy Faces Hard 
Sell, Reuters (Mar. 10, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/03/10/internet-privacy-idUSL2E8E5DM520120310. 
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indicate that industry spending on political activities has soared to 
$1.2 billion between 1998 and 2011.62 Furthermore, many of the 
substantial increases in lobbying expenditures appear to have 
occurred over the last few years. For example, social media giant 
Facebook went from spending $351,000 in 2010 to $1.35 million in 
2011.63 Moreover, with continuing congressional gridlock, the 
probability of passing comprehensive legislation on privacy issues may 
be low.64  
3. Administrative Action 
The subject of online tracking of Internet users has also become a 
focus of both the White House and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). On February 23, 2012, the Obama Administration released a 
report entitled Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A 
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the 
Global Digital Economy (“White House Report”).65 Included therein is 
a “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” that, according to the White 
House, “provides a baseline of clear protections for consumers and 
greater certainty for businesses.”66 This framework for privacy 
protection contains seven central principles that ideally should govern 
the relationship between consumers and businesses.67 Among them are 
the rights to “Individual Control,” which includes the ability to 
“exercise control over what personal data companies collect from 
them and how they use it,” and “Respect for Context,” which gives 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Matthew J. Schwartz, Do Not Track: 7 Key Facts, 
InformationWeek (Feb. 24, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.information
week.com/security/privacy/do-not-track-7-key-facts/232601425 (questioning 
whether the proposed legislation would pass and recognizing that the 
legislation was built on compromise); see also Chris Calabrese, Time to 
Get Down to Business on Privacy, ACLU (Feb. 23, 2012, 12:16 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/time-get-down-business-
privacy (discussing the White House Report’s call for new privacy laws 
and stating that “the report acknowledges that such legislation isn’t 
imminent”). 
65. White House Report, supra note 33. 
66. Press Release, The White House, We Can’t Wait: Obama 
Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to 
Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter White House 
Press Release], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-unveils-
blueprint-privacy-bill-rights. 
67. White House Report, supra note 33, at 10 (noting that the seven 
principles are (1) Individual Control; (2) Transparency; (3) Respect for 
Context; (4) Security; (5) Access and Accuracy; (6) Focused Collection; 
and (7) Accountability). 
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consumers “a right to expect that companies will collect, use, and 
disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in 
which consumers provide the data.”68  
To implement the “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,” the White 
House Report recommends a series of discussions with a wide range of 
various stakeholders to develop enforceable codes of conduct.69 
Additionally, it proposes that there be “greater interoperability 
between the United States’ privacy framework and those of our 
international partners”70 and that the FTC be provided with the 
authority to enforce the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.71 While the 
White House Report has generally been viewed as a positive step by 
many privacy and consumer groups, it is merely a framework for 
substantial, potential objectives.72 As one major international news 
agency described it, “[t]he industry got a break last month when the 
White House released a blueprint ‘privacy bill of rights’ giving 
consumers more data control, but relying heavily on voluntary 
compliance by Internet companies.”73  
A little more than a month after the White House released its 
report on consumer privacy, the FTC issued its own set of 
recommendations.74 The document, Protecting Consumer Privacy in 
an Era of Rapid Change, asserts that it is “intended to articulate best 
practices for companies that collect and use consumer data” and 
 
68. Id. at 11, 15. 
69. Id. at 2.  
70. White House Press Release, supra note 66; see also White House 
Report, supra note 33, at 31–33 (discussing in detail the need for 
greater interoperability between the United States’ system and 
international systems and the United States’ commitment to creating 
this interoperability). 
71. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 2. 
72. See, e.g., Calabrese, supra note 64 (expressing that the ACLU is 
“gratified that the administration has begun the process” but 
recognizing that it is a recommendation from which legislation is not 
imminent); Marcia Hofmann, Obama Administration Unveils Promising 
Consumer Privacy Plan, but the Devil Will Be in the Details, Elec. 
Frontier Found. (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2012/02/obama-administration-unveils-promising-consumer-privacy-
plan-devil-details (applauding the White House’s proposal but waiting 
to see whether these principles will be implemented in a way that 
effectively protects online privacy). 
73. Melvin, supra note 61. 
74. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era 
of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and 
Policymakers (2012) [hereinafter FTC Final Report], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
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“assist Congress as it considers privacy legislation.”75 The report calls 
on companies to give “consumers greater control over . . . their 
personal data through simplified choices and increased 
transparency.”76 It recommends that Congress consider enacting 
“targeted” laws to regulate the practices of data brokers that buy and 
sell consumer information,77 as well as to pass baseline privacy 
legislation.78  
As with the White House’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, 
these new guidelines issued by the FTC are also only 
recommendations. Currently, the FTC has taken the position that it 
does not have the authority to draft new privacy rules, and the report 
provides that “the framework is not intended to serve as a template 
for law enforcement actions or regulations under laws currently 
enforced by the FTC.”79 Consequently, the FTC is dependent on 
efforts by the industry to self-regulate, which for reasons discussed 
further in the next section, is problematic. 
4. Industry Response 
In the wake of increased public attention on the issue of online 
monitoring tools, advertising and related technology companies began 
to mount a tenacious campaign against “Do Not Track” initiatives. In 
2007, several of the nation’s largest trade groups in media, marketing, 
and advertising joined together to create the Digital Advertising 
Alliance (DAA).80 This group, which counts Google, Yahoo!, and 
Microsoft among its members, was purportedly created to “advocate 
for responsible advertising behavior by online businesses.”81 However, 
 
75. Id. at iii. 
76. Id. at i. 
77. Id. at iv. 
78. Id. at i. 
79. Id. at vii; Julia Angwin, Regulators Urge Web Privacy Rules, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 27, 2012, at B3 (“The FTC doesn’t have the authority to write 
new rules for privacy. Instead, it hopes its report will spur the industry 
to agree to abide by its voluntary guidelines.”); see also OFFICE OF THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITY (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm. But see 
Federal Trade Commission Calls for Privacy Legislation, ELEC. 
PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://epic.org/2012/03/federal-
trade-commission-calls.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (noting that the 
FTC “fails to explain why it has not used its current Section 5 authority 
to better safeguard the interests of consumers”). 
80. Shaylin Clark, Digital Advertising Alliance Supports Privacy Bill of 
Rights, WEBPRONEWS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/
daa-supports-privacy-bill-of-rights-2012-02. 
81. Id. 
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much of the consortium’s work has focused on the creation of industry 
self-regulatory measures “in an effort to fend off federal regulation.”82  
In July 2009, the DAA issued its report, Self-Regulatory 
Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising (“OBA Principles”).83 
This document provides for various standards in the areas of 
education, transparency, consumer control, data security, changes to 
existing policies, sensitive data, and accountability. For example, it 
“instruct[s] members to provide notice, either in an ad or on a Web 
site . . . that behavioral information is being collected” as opposed to 
including it among the maze of terms contained within a typical 
privacy policy.84 In accordance with the OBA Principles, the DAA 
also established a program that allows consumers to opt out of 
targeted advertising.85 While initially these developments might 
appear to constitute a significant step forward in protecting consumer 
privacy online, in actuality they add very little. This is due to the 
voluntary nature of the assurances, numerous exceptions, and the 
initiative’s especially limited scope.  
For example, even when an Internet user exercises an opt-out 
choice under this DAA initiative, it only requires participating 
members to cease using electronically gathered data to distribute 
targeted advertisements.86 It in no way restricts the ability of 
companies to continue tracking and collecting information regarding 
consumers’ online activities. Nor does it limit a DAA member’s 
utilization of such data for virtually any other purpose aside from 
providing customized advertising to Internet users.87 Thus, even when 
 
82. Stephanie Clifford, Industry Tightens Its Standards for Tracking Web 
Surfers, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at B4.  
83. DAA Announces Guidance for Self-Reg Principles in Mobile 
Environment, DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.
info (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) [hereinafter DAA OBA Principles]. 
84. Clifford, supra note 82. 
85. FTC Final Report, supra note 74, at 4; DAA OBA Principles, supra 
note 83.  
86. See Julia Angwin, Web Firms to Adopt “No Track” Button, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 [hereineafter Angwin, Web Firms]; 
Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, Conflict Over How Open “Do Not 
Track” Talks Will Be, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at B3; see also 
White House, DOC and FTC Commend DAA’s Self-Regulatory 
Program to Protect Consumer Online Privacy, Digital 
Advertising Alliance (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.aboutads.info/
resource/download/DAA%20White%20 House%20Event.pdf; Julia 
Angwin, Microsoft’s “Do Not Track” Move Angers Advertising 
Industry, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (May 31, 2012, 8:09 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/05/31/microsofts-do-not-track-
move-angers-advertising-industry/. 
87. Angwin, Web Firms, supra note 86; Wyatt & Vega, supra note 86. 
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a consumer affirmatively chooses to opt out, the advertising industry 
can still persist in employing electronic tools to monitor the 
consumer’s online activities.88 
Two years later, due in significant part to increased pressure from 
the FTC, the DAA published its Self-Regulatory Principles for Multi-
Site Data (“Multi-Site Principles”).89 These new standards seemingly 
extended the very narrow reach of the OBA Principles in two ways. 
First, the Multi-Site Principles appear to allow consumers to now 
potentially opt out of the gathering of all data related to their 
activities online conducted by DAA Members.90 However, “[w]hile the 
supplementary principles begin with broad language about collection 
limits, they incorporate vast exceptions that wholly swallow the 
rule.”91 For instance, the Multi-Site Principles provide an exemption 
from the requirement of granting Internet users a choice in whether or 
not they are electronically monitored for purposes of “market research 
and product development.”92 As one academic commentator testified 
in connection with a recent congressional hearing on the subject of 
online tracking, the exception is “so open-ended that I have not been 
able to discern any limits on collection . . . [and it] would seem to 
include keeping track of every click made by a consumer.”93 
 
88. Angwin, Web Firms, supra note 86; Wyatt & Vega, supra note 86. 
89. Self-Regulatory Principles for Multi-Site Data, Digital Advertising 
Alliance (Nov. 2011), http://www.aboutads.info/resource/download/
Multi-Site-Data-Principles.pdf [hereinafter DAA Multi-Site Data 
Principles]. An overview of the report states that the DAA is “[b]uilding 
on and adopting the recommendations by the FTC in its recent privacy 
report regarding the collection of Web viewing data.” See About the 
Self-Regulatory Principles for Multi-Site Data, DIGITAL ADVERTISING 
ALLIANCE, http://proxy.chary.us/www.aboutads.info/msdprinciples (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2013).  
90. DAA Multi-Site Data Principles, supra note 89, at 1 (noting in the 
introduction to the report that the “Multi-Site Data Principles extend 
beyond collection of data for OBA purposes and apply to all data 
collected from a particular computer or device regarding Web viewing 
over time and across non-Affiliate Web sites”). 
91. Jonathan Mayer, A Brief Overview of the Supplementary DAA 
Principles, CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:51 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6755. 
92. DAA Multi-Site Data Principles, supra note 89, at 2–3. 
93. The Need for Privacy Protections: Is Industry Self-Regulation 
Adequate?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & 
Transp., 112th Cong. 27 (2012) (statement of Peter Swire, Professor of 
Law, The Ohio State University). Professor Swire stated further: “My 
understanding, under the 2011 DAA principles, is that under the market 
research and product development exceptions: Companies have no 
transparency requirement; Companies have no consumer choice 
requirement; Companies can keep the data indefinitely; Companies can 
identify data that is collection without the user’s name, and combine it 
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The other major change purportedly achieved through the Multi-
Site Principles is the prohibition against using data collected for 
certain categories of potentially problematic purposes. Of particular 
relevance to this Article is the new proscription on utilizing collected 
information for “[d]etermining adverse terms and conditions of 
ineligibility for employment, promotion, reassignment, sanction, or 
retention as an employee.”94 While heralded by the DAA as a 
significant restriction, this provision has been criticized for leaving 
open the option of using such data to instead offer favorable terms or 
conditions of employment, as well as determine eligibility for a 
position.95 Furthermore, a continuing issue with both the standards 
and recently articulated constraints is the fact that there does not 
appear to be any substantial consequences for a DAA member that 
fails to abide by them. As one consumer organization aptly stated: 
“[T]here are no teeth in the Principles for Multi-Site Data . . . . 
[T]here are no repercussions spelled out for receiv[ing] a bad report. 
There’s no indication that fines or even formal reprimands will be 
issued to bad actors, and no provision for removing bad actors from 
the DAA.”96  
Additionally, a more fundamental problem with the Multi-Site 
Principles is “why the DAA, as a consortium of organizations in the 
online advertising space, would have a legitimate claim to regulate 
third-party web tracking that is not related to advertising.”97 While 
much attention paid by the public and FTC has been focused on 
electronic monitoring conducted by Internet advertising and related 
technology entities, a significant portion of such tracking activity is 
also undertaken by data brokers, mobile service suppliers, and large 
 
with identified data; Companies can combine their data with data from 
other sources, to build up a more detailed profile; and Companies can 
share data with other third parties so long as it is not used to market 
back to the specific computer or device.” Id.  
94. DAA Multi-Site Data Principles, supra note 89, at 4. The other 
categories of prohibited uses are with regard to determining adverse 
terms and conditions of or ineligibility for credit, health care treatment, 
or insurance. While the two latter categories may also be relevant in the 
context of genetic discrimination under Title I as opposed to Title II of 
GINA, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper as stated 
earlier. See supra note 15. 
95. Mayer, supra note 91 (“The principles do not, however, prohibit 
offering favorable terms or determining eligibility from third-party 
web tracking data.”).  
96. Rainey Reitman, The DAA’s Self-Regulatory Principles Fall Far Short 
of Do Not Track, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/daa-self-regulatory-principles-
fall-far-short-do-not-track. 
97. Mayer, supra note 91. 
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platform providers, which include Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
and social media.98 Although the FTC is beginning to hold public 
workshops regarding the impact of data gathering by these additional 
industry subsets99 and recommends that Congress pass targeted 
legislation,100 it is far from clear whether any non-advertising-based 
third parties will even agree to adopt the DAA’s self-regulatory 
principles.101  
Aside from the introduction of self-regulatory principles, the 
industry has also launched numerous campaigns designed to inform 
the public about the economic model associated with Internet-based 
tracking. Many of these public relations efforts highlight the fact that 
electronic monitoring is arguably a necessary tradeoff for ensuring 
much of the content on the Internet is available for free because 
without it, websites would have to start charging users for such 
information.102 Other endeavors are much more specific about 
 
98. See, e.g., FTC Final Report, supra note 74, at v.  
99. Id. With regard to a planned workshop regarding mobile privacy, the 
report states that staff “will address, among other issues, mobile privacy 
disclosures and how these disclosures can be short, effective, and 
accessible to consumers on small screens. The Commission hopes that 
the workshop will spur further industry self-regulation in this area.” Id. 
Additionally, the agency plans to host another workshop focusing on 
tracking activities by large platform providers. Id. (“To the extent that 
large platforms, such as Internet Service Providers, operating systems, 
browsers, and social media seek, to comprehensively track consumers’ 
online activities, it raises heightened privacy concerns.”). 
100. Id. The FTC’s Final Report on Consumer Privacy recommends the 
following: “To address the invisibility of, and consumers’ lack of control 
over, data brokers’ collection and use of consumer information, the 
Commission supports targeted legislation—similar to that contained in 
several of the data security bills introduced in the 112th Congress—that 
would provide consumers with access to information about them held by 
a data broker.” Id. 
101. Mayer, supra note 91. 
102. See, e.g., How Interest Based Ads Work: Frequently Asked Questions 
about Online Behavioral Advertising and the Consumer Opt Out Page, 
Digital Advertising Alliance, http://www.aboutads.info/how-
interest-based-ads-work#about-opt-out (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) 
(“The most important benefit of online behavioral advertising is the free 
Internet itself. Many non-subscription websites and online services rely 
on this type of advertising for revenue, so they do not have to charge 
users. Every time you check the news or the weather online, scan your 
favorite gossip site or political blog, or watch a popular TV show or 
music video on your computer, you are seeing the consumer benefits of 
online advertising at work.”); see also Jim Harper, It’s Modern Trade: 
Web Users Get As Much As They Give, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at 
W1 (arguing that consumer tracking is used to sell advertising space, 
and in return users get free content and further stating that if “Web 
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particular positive attributes associated with tracking. For example, 
in January 2012, Google launched “Good to Know,” an advertising 
campaign that included information on how, according to the 
company, an individual’s data makes websites more useful, helps 
provide relevant search results, and can “even predict disease.”103 This 
latter benefit refers to Google’s “Flu Trends,” which monitors search 
terms entered by the public, and, per the company, these are often 
“good indicators of actual flu activity” that consequently “provide an 
early-warning system for outbreaks of influenza.”104 On the surface, 
this type of health alert service appears exceptionally advantageous 
and seemingly innocuous. But, as further discussed in Part II, it is made 
possible in large part by society’s increased use of the Internet to obtain 
health-related information and the simultaneous widespread tracking of 
these activities. 
II. Tracking, Medical-Related Information,  
and Lack of Anonymity 
According to a 2011 report published by the non-profit Pew 
Research Center in Washington, D.C., approximately eighty percent 
of Internet users go online to obtain health-related information.105 
Additionally, almost twenty percent also utilize the Internet as a 
means for locating and connecting with other individuals facing 
similar health issues.106 But while consumers are acquiring essential 
medical information and searching for needed support, they risk 
providing advertisers, marketers, data brokers, and possibly even 
employers with a host of sensitive information on the Internet users 
themselves. As the FTC cautioned in its report on protecting 
consumer privacy online: “The enhanced ability to collect and store 
consumer data has increased the risks that data will be shared more 
broadly than understood or intended by consumers or used for 
purposes not contemplated.”107  
users supply less information to the Web, the Web will supply less 
information to them”). 
103. Good to Know, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/goodtoknow/ (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2012) (accessed by searching for the URL in the 
Internet Archive index).  
104. Good to Know: Data on Google Helping Society, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/goodtoknow/data-on-google/helping-society/ 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (according to Google’s website, the company 
has now also introduced a similar program for dengue fever). 
105. Adriana Barton, Big Pharma Wants to “Friend” You, GLOBE AND 
MAIL (July 24, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/
health-and-fitness/big-pharma-wants-to-friend-you/article4260322/. 
106. Id.  
107. FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
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The scope and breadth of such covert data gathering that can 
potentially provide information on one’s medical-related concerns and 
conditions is nothing short of astounding. For example, pharmaceutical 
companies are “using stealth marketing tactics [that include] 
eavesdropping on patients’ discussions on social networks and 
tracking patients’ ‘digital footprints’ online to target them for 
advertising.”108 Additionally, other entities—such as search engines, 
advertising networks, and online social networks—“harvest online 
conversations and collect personal details from [various Internet sites, 
including] resume sites and online forums where people might discuss 
their lives.”109 This enormous amount of data is then used to build 
detailed profiles of individual behavior over time.110 According to the 
FTC, oftentimes these profiles are “broad in scope and large in scale” 
and may include sensitive information, such as personal medical 
data.111 A groundbreaking study by The Wall Street Journal showed 
these individual dossiers often contained “one’s age, gender, race, zip 
code, income, marital status and health concerns, along with recent 
purchases.”112  
But information brokers contend that these types of data-
gathering activities are not unreasonable. The industry maintains that 
there is nothing improper with their conduct as they are only 
harvesting material Internet users have chosen to make available. In 
fact, “[m]any scrapers and data brokers argue that if information is 
available online, it is fair game, no matter how personal.”113 
Furthermore, the industry and its defenders assert that there is a 
level of personal responsibility associated with these privacy issues. 
The comments of an essayist in The Wall Street Journal are reflective 
of such views: “[R]ather than indulging the natural reaction to say 
‘stop,’ people should get smart and learn how to control personal 
information. There are plenty of options and tools people can use to 
protect privacy—and a certain obligation to use them. Data about 
you are not ‘yours’ if you don’t do anything to control them.”114 
While there may be a modicum of truth to this statement, overall the 
assessment is quite flawed. 
Not surprisingly, recent studies confirm that the vast majority of 
adults in the United States use the Internet and approximately two-
 
108. Barton, supra note 105. 
109. Angwin & Stecklow, supra note 7; see also White House Report, 
supra note 33, at 11.  
110. White House Report, supra note 33, at 11. 
111. Id. 
112. Angwin & McGinty, supra note 21. 
113. Id. 
114. Harper, supra note 102. 
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thirds have a high-speed broadband connection at home.115 In today’s 
modern information society, online access is no longer a luxury but is 
increasingly becoming more of a necessity. Additionally, with such 
use, inevitably, there is at least some exchange of personal data. But 
trying to protect this information is not as straightforward as the 
industry might suggest. This is due in part to the fact that Internet 
browser developers and computer manufacturers have generally been 
reluctant to make it easy. 
For example, as The Wall Street Journal’s Senior Technology 
Editor Julie Angwin explained in connection with a National Public 
Radio interview:  
[T]he engineers at Microsoft had a very innovative idea, which 
was to attempt to block tracking devices from companies that 
didn’t appear to be the one that you were transacting with. So 
meaning if it’s not the website that you’re actually visiting and 
it’s some other company installing some tracking device on your 
Web browser, the default was going to be no, I don’t want that. 
And unfortunately, their view was overruled by the advertising 
side of the company.116  
Moreover, even when some sort of privacy protection features are 
made available to consumers as a possible option, they are often 
difficult to locate,117 or the user’s choice is ultimately rendered 
inoperative as some tracking files can be regenerated or 
circumvented.118 Consequently, it probably does not come as a 
surprise that the FTC concluded in its 2012 study on consumer 
 
115. Internet Use and Home Broadband Connections, Pew Research Ctr., 
(July 24, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/2012/Internet-
Use-and-Home-Broadband-Connections.aspx (indicating graphically that 
approximately eighty percent of adults in the United States use the 
Internet). 
116. Fresh Air, supra note 29. 
117. Wingfield, supra note 28 (“Microsoft built its browser so that users 
must deliberately turn on privacy settings every time they start up the 
software . . . and those settings aren’t always easy to find.”). 
118. See, e.g., Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 17, at 322 (“Even before 
implementing DNT, most online behavioral tracking companies offer end 
users the option to opt-out of tracking cookies. Such an opt-out 
typically relied on the users clicking to accept an opt-out cookie. 
However, opt-out cookies were often deleted when users cleared their 
cookie folder, tossing such users unknowingly back into the ad targeting 
pool.”); Angwin, supra note 1 (“Some tools surreptitiously re-spawn 
themselves even after users try to delete them.”); Angwin & McGinty, 
supra note 21 (noting that trackers can respawn after users delete 
them); Valentino-DeVries, supra note 55 (claiming certain cookies, per a 
Berkeley study, “deliberately circumvent controls you set on your 
computer”). 
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privacy119 that “many consumers face challenges in understanding the 
nature and extent of current commercial data practices and how to 
exercise available choices regarding those practices.”120  
Electronic data gatherers also make one other focal argument in 
attempting to defend their practices. They contend that tracking is 
not a violation of consumer privacy because the information collected 
is not personally identifiable. In other words, since the data sold often 
does not initially include the actual names of individuals, data 
gatherers argue that there is no cause for concern.121 As the following 
renowned examples illustrate, the force of this claim hinges on a 
distinction without a difference because advances in technology have 
made it much easier to turn what arguably may be classified at first 
as non-personally identifiable information into personally identifiable 
data. 
A. AOL Search Inquiries 
In 2006, America Online (AOL) publicly released almost 
twenty million search queries conducted by more than six hundred 
thousand of its customers.122 The raw data sets were placed on a 
special AOL website that was intended to be utilized by academic 
researchers studying the online behavior of Internet users.123 The 
records included “the date and time of each inquiry and the address of 
the Web site the user chose to visit after searching.”124 However, 
obviously personally identifiable information had not been included, 
such as the actual names or screen names of the customers or their 
computers’ IP addresses.125 Instead, AOL replaced this data with 
randomly assigned numbers, and consequently the information was 
thought to be completely anonymized.126 
However, a number of reporters from The New York Times were 
able to show that at least part of this information could be 
 
119. See supra Part I.B.3 for more information about the FTC’s report. 
120. FTC Final Report, supra note 74, at 35. 
121. Angwin & McGinty, supra note 21. 
122. Saul Hansell, AOL Removes Search Data on Vast Group of Web Users, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2006, at C4. 
123. Katie Hafner, Tempting Data, Privacy Concerns: Researchers Yearn to 
Use AOL Logs, but They Hesitate, N.Y. Times (Aug. 23, 2006), at C1. 
124. Hansell, supra note 122. 
125. Ohm, supra note 5, at 1717; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 59, at 1818, 
1836; Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL 
Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1; Hafner, supra 
note 123. 
126. Ohm, supra note 5, at 1717; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 59, at 1818, 
1823–24; Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 125; Hafner, supra note 123; 
Hansell, supra note 122.  
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reidentified without much difficulty.127 The article described in detail 
the way they were able to link various queries, including searchers for 
“numb fingers,” “60 single men,” and “dog that urinates on 
everything” to a sixty-two-year-old woman named Thelma Arnold 
who lived in Lilburn, Georgia.128 Ms. Arnold confirmed to a reporter 
that these inquiries and a host of others were in fact hers.129 
Her searches, like those of the more than half a million other users 
included in the AOL database, appear to reveal the concerns, 
interests, and curiosities of each individual. Nonetheless, while such 
inquiries may provide “much about the person who typed them, they 
can also prove highly misleading.”130 For example, Ms. Arnold’s quest 
for information online seemed to indicate that she may be suffering 
from a wide range of possible physical and mental ailments because 
her search history also contained queries on “hand tremors,” “nicotine 
effects on the body,” “dry mouth,” and “bipolar.”131 Such a conclusion 
would appear to be incorrect, however, as Ms. Arnold admitted in an 
interview that “she routinely researched medical conditions for her 
friends to assuage their anxieties.”132 For example, regarding her 
nicotine inquiries, Ms. Arnold said, “I have a friend who needs to quit 
smoking and I want to help her do it.”133  
B. Professor Sweeney Study 
Dr. Latanya Sweeney conducted a study to illustrate the ease 
with which supposedly anonymous medical data could be reidentified 
by combining it with what could be described as fairly ordinary and 
publicly accessible information—namely voter registration lists.134 In 
Massachusetts, an entity called the Group Insurance Commission 
(GIC) was responsible for procuring health insurance for all 
individuals employed by the state. In connection therewith, GIC 
 
127. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 125 (“It did not take much investigating to 
follow that data trail to [a person].”); see also Hansell, supra note 122 
(showing how the information creates composite profiles with all but a 
name). 
128. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 125. 
129. Id. 
130. Id.  
131. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 125; Hansell, supra note 122. 
132. Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 125. 
133. Id. 
134. Recommendations to Identify and Combat Privacy Problems in the 
Commonwealth: Hearing on H.R. 351 Before the Pennsylvania House 
Select Committee on Information Security, 189th Sess. (Oct. 5, 2005) 
(statement of Latanya Sweeney, Associate Professor, Carnegie Mellon 
Univ.), available at http://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy/talks/Flick-
05-10.html#testimony. 
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gathered detailed patient data for the more than one hundred 
thousand employees and family members also insured under the 
policy. GIC eventually decided to release this information to 
researchers and industry, but before doing so, it expunged all explicit 
identifiers, including names, addresses, and Social Security numbers. 
GIC believed these steps would ensure that the data made public was 
no longer personally identifiable.135  
Dr. Sweeney purchased the voter registration list for Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, for a nominal fee—information that is now often 
available online for immediate download in many jurisdictions. The 
record provided the name, address, zip code, birth date, and gender 
for each person. Dr. Sweeney then showed how the two datasets could 
be combined to reveal the diagnoses, procedures, and medications for 
named individuals, including the then Massachusetts Governor, 
William Weld. This was possible because only “six people [on the 
Cambridge voter list] had his particular birth date; only three of them 
were men; and, he was the only one in his 5-digit ZIP code.”136 
Ultimately, “[i]n a theatrical flourish, Dr. Sweeney sent the 
Governor’s health records (including diagnoses and prescriptions) to 
his office.”137 
C. The “Fiction” of Non-personally Identifiable Information 
As the preceding examples illustrate, people who initially appear 
to be completely hidden in an anonymous database can often be 
reidentified.138 Consequently, “the traditional distinction between 
[personally identifiable information and supposedly anonymous or de-
identified information] has eroded” and “information practices and 
restrictions that rely on this distinction are losing their relevance.”139 
According to an FTC report, “[s]everal factors have contributed to 
the breakdown of this dichotomy . . . [including] the comprehensive 
scope of data collection” and the enhanced ability on the part of 
businesses “to combine disparate bits of ‘anonymous’ consumer data 
from numerous different online and offline sources into profiles that 
can be linked to a specific person.”140 
The question of how best to contend with these developments has 
generated a vigorous academic debate. Some advocate abandoning the 
 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Ohm, supra note 5, at 1720 (citing Henry T. Greeley, The Uneasy 
Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks, 
8 Ann. Rev. Genomics & Hum. Genetics 343, 352 (2007)). 
138. Id. at 1703. 
139. FTC Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
140. Id. at 36. 
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concept of non-personally identifiable information altogether. For 
example, Professor Helen Nissenbaum argues: 
The private/public dichotomy . . . is not useful as the 
foundation of a normative conception of privacy. Although, in 
the past, it might have served as a useful approximation for 
delineating the scope of a right to privacy, its limitations have 
come to light as digital information technologies radically alter 
the terms under which others—individuals and private 
organizations as well as government—have access to us and to 
information about us in what are traditionally understood as 
private and public domains.141  
Similarly, Professor Paul Ohm argues: “[W]e must abandon the 
pervasively held idea that we can protect privacy by simply removing 
personally identifiable information (PII). This is now a discredited 
approach. Even if we continue to follow it in marginal, special cases, 
we must chart a new course in general.”142 Accordingly, Ohm 
maintains that the optimal approach to protect privacy is “by 
squeezing and reducing the flow of information in society, even 
though in doing so they may need to sacrifice, at least a little, 
important counter values like innovations, free speech, and 
security.”143 
Others, however, suggest that the better method is not to 
abandon the principle of personally identifiable information altogether 
but possibly to refine it and create a more nuanced approach. 
Professors David Schwartz and Daniel Solove propose 
reconceptualizing “a standard for PII” as they anticipate “increasing 
the benefits from analysis of large data sets in ways we might not be 
able to predict in advance.”144 As such, they propose three categories 
of information: “[Information which refers to] an (1) identified, 
(2) identifiable, or (3) non-identifiable person.” Then Schwartz and 
Solove provide three different regimes of regulation based on 
traditional Fair Information Practices, noting that “[b]ecause these 
categories do not have hard boundaries, we define them in terms of 
standards.”145 According to Professors Schwartz and Solove, if privacy 
law discarded the concept of personally identifiable information it 
 
141. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, 
and the Integrity of Social Life 116–17 (2010). 
142. Ohm, supra note 5, at 1742. 
143. Id. at 1706.  
144. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 59, at 1868, 1871.  
145. Id. at 1877.  
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“would be left without a means for establishing coherent boundaries 
on necessary regulation.”146  
While the answer to which approach to analyzing personally 
identifiable information is the more salient one is unclear, the idea 
that there is one singular, comprehensive method for dealing with the 
problems produced by the increasing ability to reidentify would seem 
to be incongruous. This appears especially so in light of the fact that 
“[r]eidentification has arguably taken on special importance in the 
health privacy context.”147 As such, Professor Ohm’s mandate to 
“reexamine every privacy law, asking whether the power of 
reidentification and fragility of anonymization have thwarted their 
original designs”148 seems particularly prudent with regard to GINA.  
III. The Provisions of GINA and Current Regulations 
Keeping in mind the previous discussion concerning technological 
changes in the ability to gather and effectively utilize large quantities 
of information, we turn to the statutory provisions of GINA and the 
fairly recently implemented final rules promulgated by the EEOC.149 
As a result of the new regulations, “genetic information” is now 
broadly defined as information from “an individual’s genetic tests . . . 
the genetic tests of that individual’s family members . . . and family 
medical history” and also includes information about “an individual’s 
[or family member’s] request for, or receipt of, genetic services.”150 
This means that if, for example, there is a high incidence of breast 
cancer among women in your family, such data constitutes protected 
“genetic information,” even if you have never personally been 
diagnosed with breast cancer or been tested to determine if you are a 
carrier of one of the two known genetic mutations for breast cancer.  
Title II proscribes not only the use of genetic information in 
connection with employment-related decisions151 but also the mere 
acquisition of genetic information in most circumstances.152 GINA 
states that an employer “may not request, require, or purchase 
genetic information of an individual or family member of the 
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147. Ohm, supra note 5, at 1716.  
148. Id. at 1704. 
149. 29 C.F.R. § 1635 (2013).  
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individual.”153 The regulations also now further clarify that “request” 
includes “conducting an Internet search on an individual in a way 
that is likely to result in a covered entity obtaining genetic 
information.”154  
The rationale for including a ban on not just utilizing genetic 
information in connection with employment-related decisions but also 
on merely acquiring it in the first place is the fact that employment 
discrimination cases are notoriously difficult to prove.155 Employees 
are frequently ignorant that discrimination has even occurred. 
Consequently, in an attempt to prevent discrimination from possibly 
happening, GINA prohibits access to genetic information that may be 
the basis upon which discriminatory action might potentially be 
taken.156 As Senator Snowe aptly remarked in connection with the 
introduction of GINA in the Senate:  
[T]he threat of employment discrimination is very real, and 
therefore it is essential that we take this information off the 
table, so to speak, before the use of this information becomes 
more widespread. While Congress has not yet debated this 
specific type of employment discrimination, we have a great 
 
153. Id. 
154. Id. For example, if a potential employer performed a search on Google 
for information on me that only included my name (“Christine Davik”) 
or my current academic affiliation (“Christine Davik” and “University of 
Maine School of Law”), that would not run afoul of the provision, even 
if the search results listed included “genetic information” as defined by 
the Act. However, if the search was instead structured to possibly reveal 
my BRCA1 or BRCA2 status (for example, “Christine” and “Davik” 
and “BRCA”), to determine if I had a family history of breast cancer 
(for example, “Christine” and “Davik” and “breast cancer” and 
“family”), or to ascertain if I was active in an organization that provides 
support for individuals at an increased risk of hereditary breast cancer 
due to the existence of the BRCA genetic mutation (for example, 
“Christine” and “Davik” and “facingourrisk.org”), this could constitute 
a prohibited act under GINA. 
155. See, e.g., EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL ON RACE AND COLOR DISCRIMINATION, 15–13 (Apr. 19, 2006), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf (“Because 
discrimination often is subtle, and there rarely is a ‘smoking gun,’ 
determining whether race played a role in the decisionmaking requires 
examination of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” (citing 
Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081–82 (3d Cir. 
1996) (“It has become easier to coat various forms of discrimination 
with the appearance of propriety, or to ascribe some other less odious 
intention to what is in reality discriminatory behavior. In other words, 
while discriminatory conduct persists, violators have learned not to 
leave the proverbial ‘smoking gun’ behind.”))). 
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.1(a)(1). 
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deal of employment case law and legislative history on which to 
build.157  
At first glance, these updated and seemingly expanded definitions 
appear to give considerably more protection to employees. However, 
as discussed in greater detail in the next section, a number of the 
exceptions in the Act nonetheless appear to swallow up much of the 
potential safeguards wrought by the latest changes. This is 
particularly so when assessed concurrently with the advancements in 
electronic data gathering and aggregation. 
A. The “Publicly Available Information” Exception  
The general prohibition against requesting, requiring, or 
purchasing genetic information under GINA does not apply when an 
employer obtains such information from materials that are 
“commercially and publicly available.”158 However, this “safe harbor” 
does not exist when the employer “sought access to those sources with 
the intent of obtaining genetic information.”159 Therefore, under the 
Act as currently drafted, if an employer conducted a preemployment 
background check and obtained genetic information from a data 
aggregation service provider, or alternatively by performing his or her 
own Internet search, this would not run afoul of GINA so long as 
there was no evidence that the specific goal of such an inquiry was to 
acquire genetic information. While in the past the likelihood that an 
employer would even be able to obtain materials that could possibly 
shed light on a current or potential employee’s genetic status was 
quite low, today such a risk is far from merely theoretical. 
Recent studies show that anywhere from approximately twenty 
percent to a whopping ninety-one percent of employers now rely on 
social media in one way or another to screen potential job 
applicants.160 Of those hiring managers that do utilize such resources, 
 
157. 153 Cong. Rec. S828, 847 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2007) (statement of Sen. 
Olympia Snowe), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-
2007-01-22/pdf/CREC-2007-01-22-pt1-PgS828-3.pdf#page=19. 
158. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(4). 
159. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(4)(iii) (emphasis added). 
160. See Steve Johnson, Like or Dislike? Employers Are Increasingly 
Screening Applicants Through Online Profiles, San Mateo Cnty. 
Times, Jan. 17, 2012, at A1 (“Other surveys have found that anywhere 
from 18 percent to 63 percent of employers review social media sites to 
assess job candidates.”); Thirty-Seven Percent of Companies Use Social 
Networks to Research Potential Job Candidates, According to New 
CareerBuilder Survey, PR Newswire, Apr. 18,  2012, http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/thirty-seven-percent-of-companies-use-social-
networks-to-research-potential-job-candidates-according-to-new-
careerbuilder-survey-147885445.html [hereinafter Other Surveys] (noting 
that a new survey from CareerBuilder shows that “[n]early two in five 
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more than half do so to determine “if the candidate is a good fit for 
the company culture,” and more than a third report that social media 
assists them with ascertaining whether “the candidate is well 
rounded.”161 Consequently, the marketplace has rapidly responded to 
the demand for comprehensive data about prospective or current 
employees with new companies, products, and services to meet this 
need. The fact that electronic information gathering has become less 
expensive and more achievable has undoubtedly facilitated the growth 
of this new industry. 
For example, a company by the name of ISO provides a “Web 
Presence Search” that it claims makes “it easier to probe the Internet 
for hard-to-find information on persons of interest.”162 This is 
purportedly accomplished in part by identifying “an individual’s ‘web 
footprint’—the trail of digital information left behind from 
participation and postings on social networking and other websites.”163 
Furthermore, ISO asserts that it then combines “online search results 
with public record findings from third-party sources, such as data 
aggregators and government agencies,” thereby providing “one of the 
most effective, innovative ways to compile a comprehensive, 
multidimensional profile” of a particular individual.164 
Another firm, Sterling Infosystems, Inc., markets itself as the 
“leading provider of employment-related background screenings.”165 
 
companies (37 percent) use social networking sites to research job 
candidates,” and “[e]leven percent report they do not currently use 
social media to screen, but plan to start.”); Job Screening with Social 
Networks, REPPLER (Sept. 2011), http://reppler.files.wordpress.com/2011/
09/reppler-infographic-job-screening-with-social-networks2.jpg (detailing 
a survey of 300 hiring professionals showing that ninety-one percent of 
them use social networking sites to screen prospective employees). 
161. Other Surveys, supra note 160. 
162. New Search Helps Locate Self-reported Social Media Postings, ISO, 
http://www.iso.com/Newsletters/ClaimSearch/New-search-helps-locate-
self-reported-social-media-postings.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter New Search]. 
163. Web Presence Search, ISO, http://www.iso.com/Products/ISO-Claim 
Search-Decision-Net/Web-Presence-Search.html#.UjNU19vD_IU (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
164. New Search, supra note 162. 
165. Background Screening, Sterling Infosystems (June 30, 2013, 
9:57 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20120630095719/http://www.
sterling infosystems.com/productsandservices/backgroundscreening 
(accessed by searching for sterlinginfosystems in the Internet Archive 
index). For the current website, see Background Check Solutions for All 
Industries, STERLING INFOSYSTEMS (July 22, 2010), http://www.sterling
infosystems.com/sterling-infosystems-acquires-screening-international.htm 
(stating that “Sterling Infosystems, Inc. [is] a leading provider of 
employment and background services”). 
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Sterling also claims it provides “the business intelligence companies 
need to help select the highest quality employees” and “delivers pre-
employment background checks that satisfy the specific needs and 
rigorous standards of any employer.”166 Through its Tandem Select 
Company, Sterling offers a “Social Intelligence Hiring” service to 
“human resources, legal, compliance, and risk management 
professionals.”167 These social media background-search-report 
products supposedly “facilitate better hiring decisions and reduc[e] 
organizational risk” by screening potential employees and monitoring 
current employees.168 According to the company’s website, its 
products and services are purportedly “legally defensible” and “usable 
in the hiring process” as reports redact “protected class and other 
information not relevant to the position.”169  
Even with claims that a company affirmatively screens out 
“genetic information” (for example, Candidate A is BRCA1 positive 
based on a Facebook post), in the final report sent to the potential 
employer, the fact that Candidate A has searched online for 
information related to BRCA testing, has “liked” the Facing Our Risk 
of Cancer Empowered (FORCE) Facebook page—“a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to improving the lives of individuals affected 
by hereditary breast and ovarian cancer”170—and has participated in 
numerous five-kilometer races in her community designed to raise 
money for hereditary breast cancer research, may not be removed. 
Nonetheless, such data may provide a potential employer with 
 
166. Background Screening, Sterling Infosystems (June 30, 2013, 9:57 
AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20120630095719/http://www.sterling 
infosystems.com/productsandservices/backgroundscreening (accessed by 
searching for sterlinginfosystems in the Internet Archive index). For the 
current website, see Background Check Solution for All 
Industries, STERLING INFOSYSTEMS, http://www.sterlinginfosystems.com
/other-industry-solutions.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) (“Sterling 
provides the business intelligence you need to select the highest-quality 
employees.”). 
167. Social Media Background Check, TANDEM SELECT (Dec. 5, 2011, 12:05 
PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20111205120517/http://tandemselect. 
com/criminal-records-checks/social-media-check (accessed by searching 
for TANDEM SELECT in the Internet Archive index).  
168. Id.  
169. Id. The website additionally states that it generates “FCRA, EEOC, 
and state law compliant reports based on employer-defined criteria that 
preserve fair and consistent hiring practices.” Id.  
170. FORCE: Facing Our Risk of Cancer Empowered, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/facingourrisk?fref=ts (last visited Oct. 16, 
2013); see also FORCE: Facing Our Risk of Cancer Empowered, 
FACINGOURRISK.ORG, http://www.facingourrisk.org (last visited Oct. 
16, 2013) (“FORCE is the only national nonprofit organization devoted 
to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.”). 
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substantial clues as to the fact that this individual has probably 
tested positive for a known genetic mutation or is at a much higher 
than normal risk for carrying a genetic mutation due to family 
medical history.  
Recently, the FTC has had two separate occasions to examine the 
legality of these new, expanded forms of background screening and 
employee monitoring. In May 2011, the FTC gave its tacit approval 
to Social Intelligence Corporation’s Internet and social media 
screening reports when it completed its investigation of the company 
and “determined that no further action is warranted at this time.”171 
However, the FTC’s inquiry into the company was primarily limited 
to whether Social Intelligence was in compliance with the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA). The FTC concluded that Social Intelligence 
was in fact a “consumer reporting agency” and as such was required 
to “take reasonable steps to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of 
the information reported.”172 Additionally, “[c]onsumer reporting 
agencies must also provide employers who use their consumer reports 
with information about their obligations under the FCRA,” including 
the employer’s “obligation to provide employees or applicants with 
notice of any adverse action taken on the basis of these reports.”173 
According to Social Intelligence’s website, the company “searches 
millions of websites, including the most well-known social networking 
websites.”174 Social Intelligence even claims to possess its own 
“proprietary technology for linking people with pseudonyms or online 
names they might use in place of the offline name known to their 
[prospective or current] employer.”175 In response to a request from a 
reporter, Social Intelligence provided some samples of actual reports 
provided to employers,176 including one applicant “whose Internet 
footprint indicated drug use” as evidenced in part by his participation 
 
171. Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., FTC Div. of Privacy and 
Identity Prot., to Renee Jackson, Member, Nixon Peabody, LLP 
(May 9, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/110509social
intelligenceletter.pdf. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Frequently Asked Questions, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://www.social 
intel.com/faqs/#emp-1(last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
175. Kashmir Hill, Feds Okay Start-up That Monitors Employees’ Internet 
and Social Media Footprints, Forbes (June 15, 2011, 3:34 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/06/15/start-up-that-
monitors-employees-internet-and-social-media-footprints-gets-gov-
approval/. 
176. Id. The reporter posted screen shots of the redacted Social Intelligence 
report. See, e.g., Social Media Consumer Report, FORBES BLOG 
(June 15, 2011), http://blogs-images.forbes.com/kashmirhill/files/2011/
06/druggie-applicant.png.  
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in the Oregon Cannabis Tax Act of 2012 campaign, a citizen’s 
initiative to regulate marijuana and restore hemp “for fuel, fiber and 
food.”177 
In 2012, the FTC announced that it had settled charges with 
Spokeo, Inc. in the amount of $800,000.178 According to the FTC, the 
company collects personal information on millions of individuals “from 
hundreds of online and offline data sources.”179 It then “merges the 
data to create detailed personal profiles,” which can include one’s 
hobbies, photos, and participation on social networking sites.180 The 
FTC alleged that Spokeo marketed these profiles to human resource 
professionals, job recruiters, and others in connection with its 
advertising campaign entitled “Explore Beyond the Resume,” which 
encouraged the use of such reports as an employment screening tool.181 
Additionally, the FTC alleged that Spokeo did not “use reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of consumer report 
information” and also failed to tell employers about their obligation 
under the FCRA to notify potential or current employees if any 
adverse action was taken against the individual based on data 
contained within the report.182 As with Social Intelligence 
Corporation, the focus of the FTC’s inquiry was largely with regard 
to potential violations of the FCRA,183 without any discussion on the 
general propriety of creating and selling such tools.  
While the FTC investigations make clear that entities providing 
these modern-day background searches must comply with the FCRA, 
these protections are unsurprisingly insufficient in the context of the 
 
177. Measure 80—Oregon Cannabis Tax Act of 2012, PACIFIC GREEN PARTY, 
http://www.pacificgreens.org/node/47841 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) 
(describing the proposed legislation, including the organization’s 
endorsement of the initiative and involvement in collecting over 165,000 
signatures to qualify the petition to be placed on the 2012 ballot).  
178. Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly 
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of 
FCRA, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 12, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2012/06/spokeo.shtm [hereinafter Spokeo]. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Complaint at 4, United States v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV12-05001 (C.D. 
Cal. June 7, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023163/
120612spokeocmpt.pdf. 
182. Id. at 6–7. 
183. The one claim that was not FCRA-related involved allegations that 
“Spokeo deceptively posted endorsements of their service on news and 
technology websites and blogs, portraying the endorsements as 
independent when in reality they were created by Spokeo’s own 
employees” and as such constituted unfair or deceptive acts. Spokeo, 
supra note 178. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
We Know Who You Are and What You Are Made Of 
51 
potential for genetic discrimination. Furthermore, the language in 
GINA itself is also inadequate. As such, the current regulations need 
to be amended to ensure that an employer who conducts a 
background search on her own, or alternatively purchases such 
profiles from a third party, does not become privy to genetic 
information or what I would term “genetic status indicators,” namely 
materials that provide a likely indication of an individual's possible or 
actual genetic status at either the individual or familial level.  
Currently, the safe harbor for receipt of genetic information from 
commercially and publicly available materials applies so long as the 
employer did not intend184 to obtain the data. However, such a mens 
rea is unlikely to be present in the context of conducting or ordering 
an electronic background search. Consequently, section (b)(4)(iii) 
must be changed to prevent compromising the statute’s protections. 
The language in section (b)(4)(iii) needs to first be amended to 
remove the intent requirement and instead provide that the 
“commercially and publicly available”185 safe harbor is not applicable 
to genetic information—or materials that provide a likely indication of 
a potential or current employee’s genetic status, whether personal or 
familial—if obtained through commercially and publicly available 
sources that are reasonably likely to result in the acquisition of such 
information. In the case of searches performed by the employer 
directly, this would mean that sources “such as Web sites and on-line 
discussion groups that focus on issues” related to “genetic testing of 
individuals [or] . . . genetic discrimination” must be avoided so as not 
to run afoul of the Act if genetic information or genetic status 
indicators are obtained as a result of said search.186  
Moreover, when employers are utilizing a third party to conduct a 
background search, the “commercially and publicly available” safe 
harbor exception should be amended so as to be inapplicable unless 
an employer takes additional steps to safeguard against the receipt of 
genetic information or genetic status indicators. This should include a 
requirement that an employer must affirmatively request that the 
entity preparing such a profile not provide any “genetic information” 
as defined by the Act. Additionally, the employer should be obligated 
to affirmatively request that any information acquired from sources 
that are reasonably likely to include genetic information or genetic 
status indicators “such as Web sites and on-line discussion groups 
 
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(4)(iii) (2013) (emphasis added). 
185. Id. 
186. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(4)(iv). 
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that focus on issues” related to “genetic testing of individuals 
[or] . . . genetic discrimination” be excluded.187  
A similar provision of the Act already makes such a request 
generally necessary in order to fall within the statutory “safe harbor” 
in connection with an otherwise lawful inquiry for medical information 
that results in the receipt of genetic information. Section (b)(1)(i)(B) 
provides that liability will not attach if the following suggested 
language is utilized when a request for medical data from an 
individual or health care provider inadvertently leads to such 
acquisition:  
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) 
prohibits employers and other entities covered by GINA Title II 
from requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual 
or family member of the individual, except as specifically 
allowed by this law. To comply with this law, we are asking 
that you not provide any genetic information when responding 
to this request for medical information.188  
The provision also requires that this language be immediately 
followed by the definition of genetic information to make clear that 
this includes not only genetic testing the individual has had but also 
his or her family medical history:  
‘Genetic information’ as defined by GINA, includes an 
individual’s family medical history, the results of an individual’s 
or family member’s genetic tests, the fact that an individual or 
an individual’s family member sought or received genetic 
services, and genetic information of a fetus carried by an 
individual or an individual’s family member or an embryo 
lawfully held by an individual or family member receiving 
assistive reproductive services.189 
These suggested alterations to the “commercially and publicly 
available” safe harbor provision are necessary to accommodate the 
changes in the current commercial marketplace and availability of 
new data products. Failure to make such needed modifications leaves 
a significant gap in coverage. It also undermines the original 
objectives and concerns that led to the passage of GINA in the first 
place.  
 
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(4)(iv); Genetic Information Discrimination, 
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws
/types/genetic.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(1)(i)(B). 
189. Id. 
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B. The “Electronic Water Cooler” Exception 
Another exception to GINA’s ban on an employer obtaining 
genetic information applies when the acquisition is unintentional. The 
statute states that “[t]he general prohibition against requesting, 
requiring or purchasing genetic information does not 
apply . . . [w]here a covered entity inadvertently requests or requires 
genetic information of the individual or family member of the 
individual.”190 This provision is often referred to as the “water cooler” 
exception as it ensures that no liability attaches where a supervisor or 
manager learns genetic information about an employee during a 
casual, face-to-face conversation, including in response to an ordinary 
question such as: “How are you?”191  
The new regulations now extend this exemption to social media as 
well, providing that an employer will not be held legally accountable 
if a “manager, supervisor, union representative, or employment 
agency representative inadvertently learns genetic information from a 
social media platform which he or she was given permission to access 
by the creator of the profile at issue (e.g., a supervisor and employee 
are connected on a social networking site and the employee provides 
family medical history on his page).”192 As such, if a supervisor and an 
employee are “friends” on Facebook and the employee posts 
information about her mother’s recent diagnosis of breast cancer, 
there would be no liability on the part of the employer for acquiring 
this genetic information. Consequently, to the extent an employee or 
potential employee does not want an employer to have access to this 
type of data, the simple solution is to never post such material, or, 
alternatively, a supervisor should under no circumstances be an online 
“friend” in the first place.193 Increasingly, however, it appears this 
latter option might not be sufficient. 
The possibility that employers or potential employers might seek 
or require access to one’s private social media sites is far from purely 
hypothetical. This is because many employers now expect applicants 
 
190. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(1). 
191. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(1)(ii)(B) (clarifying that if an individual 
voluntarily gives information to his or her employer when responding to 
a general question, the employer does not violate this Act, but the 
employer may not ask direct or probing questions about the individual’s 
or family members’ health). 
192. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(1)(ii)(D). 
193. To the extent that a particular social media profile is accessible to all 
members of the public—that is, no optional privacy controls are utilized 
by the creator—then the legality of an employer acquiring genetic 
information from such a site would need to be analyzed with reference 
to 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(4)(ii) regarding publicly available materials. 
See infra Part III.A. 
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to divulge their social media passwords or grant access to their 
profiles as part of the interview and preemployment screening process 
for any sites protected with optional privacy controls.194 One of the 
first such cases to rise to the public’s attention involved the City of 
Bozeman, Montana. Applicants there were asked to provide 
information regarding any social networking sites to which they 
belonged, along with login data and passwords.195 Specifically, all 
candidates for employment with the city received a waiver statement 
in order to conduct background and reference checks, which sought 
the following: “Please list any and all, current, personal or business 
Web sites, Web page or memberships on any Internet-based chat 
rooms, social clubs or forums, to include, but not limited to: 
Facebook, Google, Yahoo, Youtube.com, MySpace, etc.”196 The City 
eventually discontinued the practice,197 but not before routinely 
utilizing it for approximately three years.198  
A somewhat similar situation arose in Maryland at the 
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, which also 
had a policy of requesting social media usernames and passwords from 
applicants and current employees seeking recertification.199 A security 
 
194. See, e.g., Manuel Valdes, Job Seekers Getting Asked for Facebook 
Passwords, Yahoo! Finance (Mar. 20, 2012, 7:55 AM), http://finance.
yahoo.com/news/job-seekers-getting-asked-facebook-080920368.html. 
195. See Ki Mae Heussner, Montana City Asks Applicants for Online 
Passwords, ABC News (June 19, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Technology/JobClub/story?id=7879939&page=1 (discussing privacy 
concerns associated with requiring applicants to release information 
about social media usage). 
196. Id. 
197. See Kashmir Hill, Bozeman, Montana Doesn’t Want Your Facebook 
Password, Forbes (June 22, 2009, 2:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2009/06/22/bozeman-montana-doesnt-want-your-facebook-
password-anymore/ (“Public backlash has prompted the city of 
Bozeman, Montana to abandon plans to ask job applicants for their 
usernames and passwords. Effective at 12:00 p.m. today, Friday, June 
19, 2009, the city of Bozeman permanently ceased the practice of 
requesting candidates selected for city positions under a provisional job 
offer to provide usernames and passwords for the candidate’s Internet 
sites.”). 
198. Heussner, supra note 196. 
199. Alexis C. Madrigal, Maryland Agency Stops Asking Interviewees for 
Facebook Login, The Atlantic (Feb. 22, 2011, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/02/maryland-
agency-stops-asking-interviewees-for-facebook-login/71582/ (stating that 
Maryland’s Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services does 
ask applicants to provide log-in information for social medial sites); see 
also Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland to 
Secretary Gary D. Maynard, Secretary, Maryland Department of Public 
Safety and Correctional Services (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to 
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guard, who had taken a leave of absence following the death of his 
mother, was asked for his Facebook log-in and password information 
so that his profile could be reviewed in connection with a 
reinstatement interview.200 While the officer complied with the 
request, he reportedly did so only because he feared that he might not 
otherwise be allowed to return to his former position.201 The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) subsequently complained publicly 
about the incident,202 and eventually the Department suspended its 
practice of asking for social media information.203 
The instances arising in Montana and Maryland are far from mere 
anomalies. Comparable cases have been identified in New York, 
Illinois, and Virginia to name just a few.204 The practices have also 
drawn the attention of legislators at both the federal and state level. 
In March 2012, Senators Blumenthal and Schumer requested that the 
EEOC and the Department of Justice investigate “a new disturbing 
trend of employers demanding job applicants turn over their user 
names and passwords for social networking and email websites.”205 
This was followed by Senator Blumenthal and Representative 
Heinrich introducing federal legislation in May of 2012 in both the 
 
Maynard], available at http://web.archive.org/web/20120608064847/
http://privacyblog.littler.com/uploads/file/ACLU%20Letter%20Jan
%2025%202011%20Maryland%20Dept%20of%20Corrections.pdf (detailing 
Officer Collin’s experience during his recertification interview). 
200. Valdes, supra note 195. 
201. Id.; Lyneka Little, What If a Would-Be Employer Wanted Access to 
Your Facebook Wall?, ABC News (March 10, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/employer-turns-facebook-friends-
hiring/story?id=13088037. 
202. Letter to Maynard, supra note 200. 
203. Madrigal, supra note 200. 
204. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 195 (chronicling instances of companies and 
government agencies asking for log-in data and passwords for social 
media sites from applicants for employment); Lance Whitney, Teacher’s 
Aide Refuses to Share Facebook Access, Is Suspended, CNET NEWS 
(Apr. 2, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57408123-
83/teachers-aide-refuses-to-share-facebook-access-is-suspended/ 
(discussing an incident in Michigan in which a teacher’s aide was 
suspended “after reportedly refusing to show a superintendent her 
Facebook account”). 
205. Press Release, Blumenthal, Schumer: Employer Demands for Facebook 
and E-mail Passwords As Precondition for Job Interviews May Be a 
Violation of Federal Law; Senators Ask Feds to Investigate (Mar. 25, 
2012), available at http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/
release/blumenthal-schumer-employer-demands-for-facebook-and-email-
passwords-as-precondition-for-job-interviews-may-be-a-violation-of-
federal-law-senators-ask-feds-to-investigate. 
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Senate and the House.206 The Password Protection Act of 2012 would 
have “prohibit[ed] employers from compelling or coercing any person 
to authorize access to a protected computer, and for other 
purposes.”207 The bills were never passed; instead, they were referred 
to Committee,208 where they simply languished.  
At the state level, there has been a recent flurry of legislative 
activity. As of January 2013, five states have laws barring employers 
from requiring job applicants or current employees to provide 
passwords, while ten other states have legislation pending.209 However, 
these statutes vary widely in terms of the circumstances in which they 
apply and the degree of protection they provide.210 Furthermore, 
despite the newfound surge of interest in enacting protection, at 
present the vast majority of states do not have this type of legal 
assistance to which potential hires or existing employees could turn. 
Consequently, to the extent that any such statutory safeguards exist, 
at least in the context of genetic information or genetic status 
indicators on private social media sites, GINA would most likely need 
to be utilized.  
However, it is not entirely clear that GINA would actually 
provide the necessary safeguards. As previously mentioned, under the 
current regulations, employers are not held legally accountable for 
inadvertently obtaining genetic information from an individual’s social 
media site if they were “given permission to access” the profile.211 In 
the previously discussed password cases, employers did not 
surreptitiously obtain the required log-in data without the potential 
or current employee’s knowledge.212 Instead, in each instance the 
information was provided directly from the creator itself, albeit with 
 
206. Password Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 5684, 112th Cong. (2012); 
Password Protection Act of 2012, S. 3074, 112th Cong. (2012).  
207. H.R. 5684; S. 3074. 
208. Id. 
209. See Donna Ballmen, Can Your Employer Demand Your Social Media 
Passwords?, AOL Jobs (Jan. 30, 2013, 9:50 AM), http://jobs.aol.com/
articles/2013/01/30/employer-social-media-passwords/ (indicating that 
Maryland, Illinois, California, Michigan, and New Jersey have passed 
legislation banning employers from asking for social media passwords; 
Delaware bans educational institutions from asking students for social 
media passwords; California is contemplating future expansion; and 
Colorado, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont are considering 
legislation).  
210. See Michelle Poore, A Call for Uncle Sam to Get Big Brother Out of 
Our Knickers: Protecting Privacy and Freedom of Speech Interests in 
Social Media Accounts, 40 N. Ky. L. Rev. 507, 521–24 (2013).  
212. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(1)(ii)(D) (2013).  
212. See supra notes 196–205. 
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some concern, hesitation, or possibly both. Nonetheless, this could 
arguably constitute the necessary consent to allow employers to avail 
themselves of the exemption from liability.  
Consequently, the statute needs to be amended to make clear that 
this exception can be utilized by an employer only when an individual 
has “voluntarily” provided access in the true sense of the word. 
Therefore, to the extent that an employer or potential employer 
requests access to one’s personal e-mail message systems, social 
networking profiles, or similar sites in the context of evaluating the 
individual for continued employment, initial hire, or any other 
employment-related decision, this will not constitute being “given 
permission” for purposes of the Act. It is vitally important that this 
actual or perceived ambiguity be remedied to ensure the goals of 
GINA are met—namely, to provide current or prospective employees 
with the necessary legal assurances that their genetic information, or 
even genetic status indicators, will not be obtained or used by an 
employer. Otherwise, individuals may be deterred from acquiring 
valuable genetic testing due to concerns over the way in which results 
obtained could be used against them or their relatives. 
C. The “Aggregated Data from Voluntary 
Wellness Programs” Exception  
Under certain circumstances, GINA’s general prohibition against 
acquiring genetic information may be exempted where an employer 
obtains such data in connection with the provision of a voluntary 
“wellness program.”213 The general objective of these plans is to 
improve overall health and fitness so as to prevent detrimental and 
expensive conditions in the future.214 According to a study conducted 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “54 percent of full-time public 
sector employees and 28 percent of private sector employees had 
access to a wellness program in 2008.”215 In order to combat rising 
healthcare costs, “employers are increasingly turning to workplace 
wellness programs that reward employees who engage in healthy 
behaviors—or, alternatively, penalize those who don’t.”216 
 
213. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2). 
214. Shelley Frost, Employee Fitness & Wellness Programs, Livestrong 
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.livestrong.com/article/356864-employee-
fitness-wellness-programs/ (discussing the benefits and objectives of 
employer-sponsored wellness plans). 
215. Id. 
216. Sarah Kliff, Will Workplace Wellness Programs Work?, Wash. Post’s 
WonkBlog (Mar. 13, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/post/will-workplace-wellness-programs-work/2012/03/
13/gIQABWUU9R_blog.html (discussing the effectiveness of workplace 
wellness programs). 
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For example, the University of Maine System implemented the 
“RiseUp Wellness Program” last year.217 Services are provided by a 
separate health care company, and it is voluntary in the sense that an 
employee is not required to participate. Nonetheless, if an employee 
does not take part in the program, the monthly cost of that 
employee’s premium for health insurance coverage increases 
substantially, making the decision to enroll less of a choice and more 
obligatory in nature.218  
An exemption from liability is provided to employers so long as 
“individually identifiable genetic information . . . is not disclosed to 
the employer except in aggregate terms.”219 This provision further 
provides that an employer does not violate the Act “if it receives 
information that, for reasons outside the control of the [wellness 
program] provider or the covered entity (such as the small number of 
participants), makes the genetic information of a particular individual 
readily identifiable with no effort on the covered entity’s part.”220 Part 
of the problem with this exception is that neither the original 
legislation nor the regulations provide a definition of “aggregate” 
data. Therefore, depending on the level of detail and the manner in 
which the data sets are enumerated, it is quite possible that the 
information is non-personally identifiable in name only. Additionally, 
the prohibition on an employer’s attempt at reidentification does not 
contain any further safeguards. On a more theoretical level, such 
reidentification bans are generally destined for failure because they are 
so difficult to enforce.221 As one academic commentator aptly stated: 
“How do you detect an act of reidentification? Reidentification can 
happen completely in the shadows.”222  
In order to strengthen the statute and provide employees with an 
enhanced measure of protection, the exception should be amended to 
 
217. RiseUp Wellness Program, Univ. of Maine, http://www.umsriseup. 
maine.edu/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
218. Id. 
219. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8 (b)(2)(i)(D) (2013). 
220. Id.  
221. Ohm, supra note 5, at 1758 (“A reidentification ban is sure to fail, 
however, because it is impossible to enforce.”). 
222. Id. (“[The] problem [with reidentification bans] appears insurmountable, 
although four forces might help to ameliorate it. First, lawmakers might 
pair a ban with stricter penalties and better enforcement, for example 
by declaring reidentification a felony and providing extra money . . . for 
enforcement. Second, lawmakers can give citizens a private right of 
action against those who reidentify. Third, lawmakers can mandate 
software audit trails for those who use anonymized data. Finally, a 
smaller scale ban, one imposed only on trusted recipients of specific 
databases—for example, a ban prohibiting government data-miners from 
reidentifying—may be much easier to enforce.”). 
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require the employer to affirmatively request that the wellness 
program provider utilize, at minimum, commercially reasonable 
methods of data aggregation to safeguard the identity of individual 
participants in wellness programs when reporting aggregate data to 
the employer. Failure to do so would preclude the employer from 
falling within this exception. Such a change is essential to ensure 
employees are not left with the unenviable choice of conceivably 
providing an employer access to their genetic information in 
connection with a “voluntary” wellness program or, alternatively, 
“choosing” not to participate and thereby possibly facing a significant 
financial burden in the form of increased monthly healthcare 
premiums in order to maintain the confidentiality of their genetic 
status, family medical history, or both. 
Conclusion 
The overarching issues of tracking consumers’ online activities, 
the ease of identification, and the widespread privacy concerns it 
raises are progressively receiving more attention not only from legal 
academics but also from the White House, the FTC, and legislatures 
at both federal and state levels. Nonetheless, at least in the short 
term, it appears highly unlikely that there will be a comprehensive 
solution to the challenges associated with such electronic monitoring. 
In the meantime, the changes articulated in this Article will 
strengthen and thus improve GINA. In turn, this will hopefully lessen 
the hesitancy of patients to obtain the medical testing that could 
benefit them, thus fulfilling the goals of GINA. 
  
 
   
